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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on the 
issue of informed consent to surgery where: 
1. Mr. Morgan failed to show by expert testimony 
that the surgery Dr. Gibbons' performed 
carried a "substantial and significant" risk 
of "serious harm" — a showing that is 
necessary to establish that Dr. Gibbons had a 
duty to disclose the risk of such harm; 
2. Reasonable minds could not differ that any 
reasonable and prudent person in Mr. Morgan's 
condition would choose to undergo surgery to 
cure a serious and even potentially life-
threatening condition after being informed of 
its risks and the risks of non-treatment; and 
3. It is undisputed that Plaintiff executed a 
written consent to the surgery performed. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The standard of review for this issue, is stated in Hill v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992): 
We affirm a trial court's grant of a motion for summary 
judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not 
relied upon below. See, Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 
1988); cf. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
1239, 1241-42 (Utah 1987). However, any rationale for 
affirming a decision must find support in the record. 
- 1 -
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1987) (attached as Appendix) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a medical malpractice action in which 
Plaintiff/Appellant Daniel P. Morgan ("Mr. Morgan") seeks damages 
for having developed a post-operative abscess following sinus 
surgery in March 1990. Mr. Morgan has stipulated that 
Defendant/Appellee Gary Gibbons, M.D., ("Dr. Gibbons") complied 
with the standard of care of a specialist in otolaryngology in 
the performance of the surgery and in providing post-operative 
care. (Appellant's Brief, p. 3.) Mr. Morgan's only remaining 
allegation is that Dr. Gibbons failed to obtain Mr. Morgan's 
informed consent to the surgery. Id. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Morgan commenced this action on October 18, 1991. 
(R. 1.) On December 24, 1992, Dr. Gibbons moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Mr. Morgan's allegations were 
unsupported by expert testimony. (R. 61.) 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
Judge Gordon J. Low entered a memorandum decision on 
March 24, 1991, and an order granting Dr. Gibbons' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on April 6, 1993. (R. 165, 168.) Mr. Morgan 
filed a notice of appeal on May 6, 1993. (R. 169.) 
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D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In October 1989, Mr. Morgan developed a sharp pain below his 
right eye which appeared in combination with fever and nasal 
congestion. When the problem persisted despite treatment at an 
InstaCare facility, Mr. Morgan went to Dr. Gibbons, a board 
certified specialist in otolaryngology. (Deposition of Daniel 
Morgan [hereinafter "Morgan"], R. 74 - 76; Deposition of Gary 
Gibbons, M.D. [hereinafter "Dr. Gibbons"], R. 89 - 90.) 
Dr. Gibbons prescribed antibiotics and decongestants which 
relieved Mr. Morgan's symptoms for a time. His symptoms, 
however, reoccurred in December and again in January 1990. 
(Morgan, R. 77 - 80.) 
On January 22, 1990, Dr. Gibbons performed a physical 
examination and a CT scan, discovering polyps in Mr. Morgan's 
sinuses. The polyps appeared to be inverted papilloma, tumors 
which behave like a malignancy in that they invade surrounding 
structures, endangering the sinus bones, the eye and the brain. 
(Dr. Gibbons, R. 91 - 92.) The only safe alternative for 
treatment of Mr. Morgan's condition was surgical removal of the 
diseased tissue. (Dr. Gibbons, R. 93.) Dr. Gibbons explained to 
Mr. Morgan the dangers inherent in an inverted papilloma. 
Mr. Morgan, who described himself as a "reasonably compliant 
person," accepted Dr. Gibbons' recommendation and agreed to the 
surgery. (Morgan, R. 81 - 83.) Surgery was scheduled for 
February 28, 1990. 
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On February 27, 1990, the day prior to surgery, Dr. Gibbons 
performed another history and physical examination of Mr. Morgan. 
Dr. Gibbons described the technique of surgery to be used. 
Mr. Morgan concedes that, during that exam, Dr. Gibbons explained 
to him that "there is always the risk of infection" associated 
with the surgery, and that Dr. Gibbons answered all of his 
questions. (Morgan, R. 84 - 85.) After Dr. Gibbons' 
explanation, Mr. Morgan signed a Written Consent to Operation, 
Anesthesia and Other Medical Services. (R. 97; Morgan, R. 86.) 
Following the operation, Mr. Morgan developed an infection 
in the form of a subperiosteal abscess which required surgery to 
drain. (Dr. Gibbons, R. 94 - 95.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was appropriately rendered below because 
Mr. Morgan failed to produce expert testimony establishing that 
the surgery Dr. Gibbons performed carries a "substantial and 
significant risk" of causing "serious harm." Absent such 
testimony, Mr. Morgan cannot show that Dr. Gibbons had a duty to 
disclose the risk of developing the complications from which 
Mr. Morgan suffered. Moreover, this action is barred by the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act") because it cannot be 
disputed that a reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's condition prior 
to surgery would opt for that treatment after being fully 
informed of the risks of treatment and non-treatment. Finally, 
the Act bars Mr. Morgan's action because the written consent 
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Mr. Morgan executed prior to surgery constitutes a complete 
defense to a claim of lack of informed consent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
MR. MORGAN FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY EXPERT TESTIMONY 
THAT THE SURGERY PERFORMED CARRIES A "SUBSTANTIAL 
AND SIGNIFICANT RISK" OF "SERIOUS HARM." 
Mr. Morgan argues that summary judgment should be reversed 
because a factual dispute exists concerning what risks 
Dr. Gibbons disclosed to Mr. Morgan prior to surgery. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) According to Mr. Morgan, "the 
critical factual issue which is hotly disputed by the parties is 
what disclosures of risks of the surgical procedure proposed by 
Dr. Gibbons were disclosed to Mr. Morgan, Ph.D." Id. The 
factual question of what risks were disclosed, however, was not 
relevant to summary judgment. That question would have become 
important only if Mr. Morgan had established what risks 
Dr. Gibbons had a duty to disclose. The issue before the trial 
court on summary judgment, therefore, was whether Mr. Morgan had 
any legal basis for his claim that Dr. Gibbons' breached his duty 
to disclose risks. 
A physician's duty to disclose risks is governed by the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 
to -15 (1987 & Supp. 1989). Under the Act, a plaintiff can 
overcome the presumption of informed consent if he or she proves, 
inter alia, that "the health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious 
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complications are generally outside the knowledge of lay persons. 
It is well settled under Utah law that matters outside the 
knowledge and experience of lay persons must be established by 
expert testimony. King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 832 P.2d 858 
(Utah 1992); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d (Utah 1992); 
Chadwick, supra; Hoopiiaiana v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 
P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 
(Utah 1980). The rationale for requiring expert testimony 
concerning such matters is identical to the reason behind 
requiring physician disclosure in the first place. The 
Washington Supreme Court explained: 
The central reason for requiring physicians to disclose 
risks to their patients is that patients are unable to 
recognize the risks by themselves. Just as patients 
require disclosure of risks by their physicians to give 
an informed consent, a trier of fact requires 
description of risks by an expert to make an informed 
decision. 
Smith v. Shannon, 666 P.2d 351, 356 (Wash. 1983). 
Moreover, lay factfinders need more than just a description 
of the risks; they also need information on the likelihood of 
occurrence. Clearly, whether a risk is "substantial and 
significant" is a function not only of severity, but also of 
frequency. A complication that occurs so infrequently as to pose 
only a remote risk of harm cannot reasonably be found to be 
"substantial and significant." See, e.g., Stottlemire v. Cawood, 
213 F. Supp 897 (D.D.C 1968) (1 in 800,000 chance of aplastic 
anemia does not require disclosure); Yates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982 
(Kan. 1964) (1.5 percent chance of losing eye does not require 
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Id. Several other states have reached the same result for the 
same reason. See, e.g., Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 913 
(Colo. 1982) ("the substantiality of a particular risk must be 
determined on the basis of expert medical testimony"); Ritz v. 
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 436 So.2d 987, 991 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("What are the accepted risks, what are 
foreseeable risks, what are remote and speculative risks require, 
in our opinion, expert testimony as a basis for determining the 
extent of disclosures necessary to constitute consent as 
* informed.'"); Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 392 A.2d 600, 
606 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), aff'd 413 A.2d 315 (N.J. 
1979) ("The alleged inadequacy of [a physicians] disclosure must 
be established by expert medical testimony because no lay jury 
can be expected to reach a conclusion on such a technical matter 
unaided by such testimony. For example, it may well be that 
medical practice regards the risk material to the case as being 
so statistically remote that, when measured by the gravity of 
harm to be expected from lack of such treatment, disclosure 
thereof is normally not made."); Maguire v. Taylor, 940 F.2d 375, 
377 (8th Cir. 1991) ("North Dakota law provides that ^expert 
medical testimony is generally necessary to identify the risks of 
treatment, their gravity, likelihood of occurrence, and 
reasonable alternatives. The necessity for expert testimony is 
particularly so when such information is outside the common 
knowledge of laymen.,,f); Bearfield v. Hauch, 595 A.2d 1320, 1321 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("The trier of fact must be supplied with 
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that the doctor's duty to get the informed consent of the patient 
must be measured by a professional medical standard."); Fuller v. 
Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ark. 1980) (requiring "expert medical 
testimony for the jury to determine whether a physician's failure 
to disclose constitutes a breach of his duty to disclose"); Gurr 
v. Willcutt, 707 P.2d 979, 985 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (statute 
requires that "every action for medical malpractice must be 
proven by" expert testimony); Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452, 
461 (Idaho 1992) (statute requires "an objective, professional 
medical standard for disclosure in informed consent cases"); 
Guebard v. Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d. 751, 755 (111. App. Ct. 1983) 
("The failure of the physician to conform to the professional 
standard of disclosure must be proved by expert medical 
evidence."); Charley v. Cameron, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Kan. 1974) 
("Expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish that 
[disclosures] were insufficient to accord with disclosures made 
by reasonable medical practitioners under the same or like 
circumstances."); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1131 (Me. 
1980) ("The scope of a physician's duty to disclose is measured 
by those communications a reasonable medical practitioner in that 
branch of medicine would make under the same or similar 
circumstances and that the plaintiff must ordinarily establish 
this standard by expert medical evidence."); Marchlewicz v. 
Stanton, 213 N.W.2d. 317, 320 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) ("The 
question of whether a doctor is negligent in failing to inform 
the patient of possible consequences of an operation is to be 
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f o l l o w e d t\ t • n e c ' i c a . e ^ a i* • , : t ^r *r 
.eStliWn; ^™ what- r^  .. _ d- 'ic 
practitione . ; similar circumstances, 
488 
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h 
what easonable 1 racti tione- . isciost1 **< --i* : 
simi'1- circumstances 
Under eithei 
car* -equiremer* expert test nnu rw-*«u-:,r, partict o; 
ise at bdx,. x. • pprtnr^pd 
Gibbons «».vi«w*. ur» procedure, 
persons. The natu-e of t IOUS t < M\-
die xxjvewise 
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unknown to lay persons. Similarly, people who do not perform 
Caldwell-Luc procedures are unfamiliar with the standard of care 
otolaryngologists follow when determining which risks are 
material and therefore warrant disclosure. Consequently, a 
finder of fact deciding this case in the absence of expert 
testimony would have no basis for a verdict other than mere 
speculation and conjecture. Such a groundless verdict is 
impermissible. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 2d 262, 139 P.2d 220 
(1943); Hoopiiaiana, supra. The requirement of expert testimony 
is therefore appropriately applied to the case at bar. 
B. Utah Case Law Does Not Support Mr. Morgan's Assertion That 
Expert Testimony is Optional in This Case. 
Mr. Morgan argues that expert testimony is unnecessary in 
informed consent cases. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11 - 14.) His 
argument, however, is not supported by the cases upon which he 
relies: Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1976) and 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied, 409 
U.S. 1064 (1972). (Appellant's Brief, p. 12.) Both Ficklin and 
Canterbury acknowledge the subtle but critical distinction that 
Mr. Morgan misses: lay persons can determine whether a provider 
breached a duty of disclosure only after expert testimony defines 
the scope of that duty. The Ficklin court held that expert 
testimony is optional only with respect to whether a provider 
breached the duty; it did not hold that lay testimony is 
sufficient to determine what risks are material and therefore 
should be disclosed. Ficklin at 298. Similarly, the Canterbury 
court did not require expert testimony to assist the fact 
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finder ,s determinati -••-. cascinaD I y , t\Kpi'scl.db ie effecl m 
risk disclosure [patient's] decision" about treatment. 
Canterbury, s au t**m But Canterbury held that "[e]xperts 
are ordinarily indispensabL e 
factfinder the risks of therapy and the consequences leaving 
c treated." (Id.) 
This two-part distinction from Canterbury was clearly 
explained in Smith v. Shannon, 666 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1983): 
The determination of materiality is d 2-step 
process. Initially, the scientific nature of the risk 
must be ascertained, i.e., the nature of the harm which 
may result and the probability of its occurrence. See, 
Canterbury v. Spence, supra at 787 - 88. [Other 
citations omitted.] The trier of fact must then decide 
whether the probability of that type of harm is a risk 
which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding 
< treatment. 
While the second step of this determination of 
materiality clearly does not require expert testimony, 
the first step almost as clearly does . [E]xpert 
testimony is necessary to prove the existence of a 
risk, its likelihood of occurrence, and the type of 
harm ' question. 
Smith, QO r.t at 356 Droperly understood, therefore, 
Canterbury and 
produce expert testimony establish the materiality of the 
risk; which ones are "substantial -•• - significant " 
Rather, they support tl: le 
Chadwick that expert testimom s mandator issue of 
whet lsks
 Qf s i n u s surgery were substantia: 
significant. See, Chadwick v Nielsen, i i t 
(Utah App. 1988). 
_
 1 4 _ 
For separate reasons, Plaintiff's burden to establish the 
materiality of risk by expert testimony is not excused by the 
Utah Supreme Court's holding in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1980). The dispute in Nixdorf concerned a physician's duty 
to inform his patient that a needle had been left inside her 
during surgery. This Court in Nixdorf found no need for expert 
testimony to define the scope of a physician's duty to disclose 
information material to the patient's physical condition after 
surgery. Nixdorf at 354. In doing so, however, the Court made 
clear that M[t]he present situation differs from that found in 
the informed consent context and our approach to it must reflect 
this difference." (Id., n.4.) The Court therefore did not apply 
the informed consent provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act which require physicians to disclose only those 
risks of serious harm that are "substantial and significant." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(d),(e) (1987). Furthermore, this 
Court in Nixdorf found that the underlying negligence issue did 
not require expert testimony because leaving a surgical 
instrument in the body was a result such that "people would know 
from common knowledge and experience it is more probably than not 
the result of negligence." Id. at 353. Nixdorf is not analogous 
to the case at bar because it concerned matters within the 
knowledge and experience of lay persons, because it was not 
decided under the informed consent statute, and because it dealt 
with a duty to disclose information about a patient's condition 
rather than the duty to disclose a risk prior to surgery. 
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testimony relevant to the issues presented in I his case, 
c
* This Court Should Not Consider Mr. Morgan's Argument that 
Dr. Gibbons7 Testimony Establishes a Prima Facie Case 
Because That Argument is Unsupported by Citations to the 
Record. 
Morgan assert 
purposes of establishing prima facie case, testimony of 
Dr. Gibbons with respect iu whether the health care he rendered 
carried with It a substantial and significant risi .- e 
patient serious harm" (Appellant's Brief, p. ; doing so, 
Morgan ibbons' testimony without citing to 
the recorc The portion : nr Gibbons' 
testimony that Morgan claims "intended , e/ is rot even 
) 
This Court should not accept Mr. Morgan' rterpretat . f 
, Gibbons' testimony because an appellate court should "only 
record. Schettler, 768 d ?-AJ, '" 
(Utah App. 198^ v-t- *» : Koulis Standard ; - 2d 
Ins. + 1978)). 
The propriety of summary judgment f affected by any 
< i i - i . 
Rather, the summary judgment concerned whether Mr. Morgan 
established the scope oi v*.. Gibbons' duty disclose 
demonstrating that the surgery performed u> . <l ' \u 
significant risks of causing the patient serious harm." Because 
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Mr. Morgan offered no expert testimony establishing that the 
Caldwell-Luc procedure carried such risks, the trial court 
correctly ruled that Mr. Morgan had failed as a matter of law to 
establish a prima facie case. 
POINT II. 
IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT A REASONABLE, PRUDENT PERSON 
IN MR. MORGAN'S CONDITION, KNOWING THE RISKS OF 
TREATMENT AND NON-TREATMENT, WOULD CHOOSE SURGERY. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act presumes informed 
consent. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1987). According to the 
Act, "[w]hen a person submits to health care by a health care 
provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider 
did was expressly or impliedly authorized to be done." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1987). In order to overcome that presumption, 
a plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that "a reasonable, prudent 
person in the patient's position would not have consented to the 
health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all 
facts relevant to the decision to give consent." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-5(1)(f) (1987). Mr. Morgan has failed to make this 
showing. In fact, in neither his memorandum opposing summary 
judgment nor his Appellant's Brief does Mr. Morgan even assert 
that a reasonable person in his position would forego treatment. 
(R. 126 - 27; Appellant's Brief, 17-20.) It is therefore not 
surprising that the trial court, after reviewing the risks of 
treatment and non-treatment supplied by Dr. Gibbons and noting 
the complete absence of evidence to the contrary, concluded that 
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 r easonable person in tine plaintiff's 
circumstances would have consented to the surgery. (I* Hi2.) 
The trial court had good reasons iur determining that a jui \ 
hearincr nr-. lbbons' description of Mr. Morgan's situation -••• .and 
no expert evidence to the contrary wou] d fi nd that a 
reasonable person :i i i I In : If :)i:i gai :r" : * i :iat:ii o i i u on :i ] c:i nhoose snrqor^ rm 
Mr Morgan's circumstances prior the operation were as 
follows: Hi Gibbons had correctly concluded that Mr. Morgan 
i in i \\\ '-Tted [.."dp i I Ionia i n li i :•: \\ I nui ' •' r ove r te<l 
papilloma Is a disease that spreads like a malignant tumor. 
(R. 9:1 - 92 ) It can affect the bones of the si nus and the 
ti ssn les of the ej e ., the opti c i ler v e an: id 1:1: ie br a i i: :i 
Surgery - u reatment that prevent 1nverted papilloma 
from causing the loss of Mr. Morgan's - and possible brain 
v; because of 
the virtual assurance that bone and tissue would destroyed, 
Dossibilil vi:^ rogress into the eye and brain could 
Morgan faced — a small 
percentage chance c <;:; infection, additional surgery or even 
minor visual disturbance
 a x e s j_n comparison. A reasonable 
i.;*: ance of surgical damage with the 
strong likelihood of a catastrophic course of disease would not 
forsake the only treatment available. 
i7Because Mr. Morgan has conceded that summary judgment was 
properly granted on the standard of care issues (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 7-8), it is undisputed that Dr. Gibbons' diagnosis was 
correctly made. 
Because the evidence concerning the risks of treatment and 
non-treatment were compelling and undisputed, the trial court 
acted within its discretion when ruling as a matter of law that a 
reasonable person in Mr. Morgan7s condition would choose surgery 
despite being informed of its risks. "[W]hen the moving party 
has presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its 
favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidencef 
a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of 
fact is present or would be at trial." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). Furthermore, when 
reasonable minds could not differ, a trial court has the 
prerogative of determining that there is no genuine issue left 
for a jury to decide. Polycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1979) (quoting Coronado Mining Corp. v. Marathon Oil, 577 
P.2d 957 (Utah 1978)). The trial court's summary judgment in 
this case comports with a New York appellate decision where a 
plaintiff failed to present expert testimony establishing the 
materiality of risk. See, Hylick v. Halweil, 492 N.Y.S.2d 57 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985). The Hylick court upheld a trial court's 
dismissal because the absence of expert testimony on the 
materiality of risks left the factfinder without any basis to 
determine what a reasonable person would choose. Id. at 59. 
According to the Hylick court: 
Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony of plaintiff and 
her expert was sufficient to constitute a prima facie 
showing of qualitative insufficiency of consent, 
plaintiff was still required to establish, inter alia, 
that a "reasonably prudent person in the patient's 
position would not have undergone the treatment or 
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diagnosis if he had been fully informed." [Citations 
omitted.] Such a determination would necessarily 
require the fact-finder to balance the risks associated 
with having the procedure performed, against the risks 
associated with foregoing it. This record is devoid of 
any evidence upon which a fact-finder could give a non-
speculative answer to that question, and the cause of 
action was therefore properly dismissed. [Citations 
omitted.] 
j . u . L i k e t r : Morgan ha?/; I a i l e d t o 
present any evidence which, shown to a factfinder, would 
support inding that easonable person : .-s position would 
\m 
rgument that a reasonable and prudent person 
woulc so is simp] untenable. The trial court therefore acted 
:hat a factf i i ider i: B v i ewi i lg a] ] the 
evidence presented must conclude that a fu] 1 y informed, 
reasonable, prudent person i n Mr. Morgan's position would have 
I i,ill LiH,,1 i iriver I cull pap i I lona. 
After i court determines that reasonable minds could 
not differ factual issue, then, "[o]n appea ] , it is 
appei . t I: .1 lat the t"rial court 
exceeded its authority," Polycoat, supra. Mr Morgan cannot 
carry that burden because there is neither an assertion nor a 
!"•  (• n i l J I l<i n i i«\ idem.'o in I he record contradicting Dr. Gibbons' 
testimony that inverted papilloma is a very dangerous condition 
which requires surgical intervention. (See, R. 9 3 93, ) 
Consequently, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Rather than discussing what a reasonable person in his 
circumstance would choose, Mr. Morgan contends that the trial 
court erred by not considering Mr. Morgan's subjective state of 
mind. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 17 - 18.) Mr. Morgan asserts: 
Judge Low categorically rejected the testimony of 
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D., including the testimony given to 
Judge Low at the conclusion of oral arguments by 
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D., himself, that he would not have 
proceeded with the surgery had the risks of the 
complication he experienced been disclosed to him. 
That testimony is discounted 100% by Judge Low in his 
ruling. 
Id. Furthermore, Mr. Morgan argues that the trial court should 
be reversed in order to allow a factfinder to hear evidence on 
Mr. Morgan's state of mind: 
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D., submits that in claims based on lack 
of informed consent, that a jury trial is required to 
allow the "finder of fact" to evaluate the claimant's 
state of mind and whether he would have indeed 
consented to surgery, at the time immediately before 
the surgery when appropriate disclosures were not made. 
Such a jury would need to consider Mr. Morgan, Ph.D.'s 
testimony, and perhaps the testimony of other lay 
witnesses, which would address Mr. Morgan, Ph.D.'s 
state of mind as of the time he made the decision to 
consent to the surgery . . . . 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 19.) 
It was not error, however, for the trial court to disregard 
Mr. Morgan's state of mind. The question before the court was 
whether "a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position" 
would have consented to surgery despite being fully informed of 
the risks. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) (1987). This is an 
objective standard, not a subjective one. The trial court 
properly disregarded Mr. Morgan's subjective state of mind when 
determining that a reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's position 
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surgery. i 
about Mr. Morgans state - :herefore I s not a valid ground 
for reversal of summary judgment. 
Mr, Morgan also argues that the trial court should define 
the materiality risks only after knowing the actual outcome 
t h e surge? • a n I;' s R r i e i ,l 11 ) "' III!'" I m t» A » 1 however, 
establishes that the proper time judge the materiality 
risks for the purpose c .nformed consent is "before health care 
I n r i H u n a 1 mi in ii'iii i in * s 
alleged • -av-c arisen from said health care." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78- ;4-5(1) (1987), According to Mr Morgan: 
[T]he risks claimed to have been disclosed by 
Dr. Gibbons with respect to not taking any action 
proved to be false, while the risk of disruption of the 
bony medial wall between the ethmoid sinus and the 
orbit of the eye proved to be a very real risk for 
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D. 
(Appellant --*% - Morgan's reading of the Art 
»at lent,f... ul o vc i y i i sk I hat. 
occurs rather than only the "substantial and significant" risks 
of serious harm that could occur. Mr. Morgan's interpretation of 
the «l|k",t' " • I mil "i iiii|ial i hi M wilh tin rh iii language < e 
and -\ t lolding in Reiser \ »« Lohner, 641 P. 2d 93 (Utah 
1982), which establish a dut^ wn ^ ^o "substantial and 
signi ks as viewed nri< -> surgery, Mr, Morgan's 
argument herefore, does not state a grounds for reversing the 
tria± c 
^ . i ... correctly held that a factfinder hearing the 
undisputed testimony of Dr. Gibbons would decide that ; r_. ^ 
informed, reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's position prior to 
surgery would choose surgical treatment. Because this issue was 
undisputed, because the substance of Dr. Gibbons' testimony is 
compelling, and because the trial court applied the correct 
standards, the summary judgment should be upheld. 
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POINT III. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE IT IS 
UNDISPUTED THAT MR. MORGAN EXECUTED A WRITTEN 
CONSENT TO THE SURGERY THAT WAS PERFORMED. 
Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act"), a 
written consent is a complete defense to an allegation of lack of 
informed consent. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(2) (1987). The Act 
provides that "it shall be a defense to any malpractice action 
. . . based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written 
consent which sets forth the nature and purpose of the 
intended health care and which contains a declaration that 
the patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious 
harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial 
results of health care and which acknowledges that health 
care providers involved have explained his condition and the 
proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all 
questions asked about the health care and its attendant 
risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the 
patient or his representative; such written consent shall be 
a defense to an action against a health care provider based 
upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient 
proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to 
consent or shows by clear and convincing proof that the 
execution of the written consent was induced by the 
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation 
or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(2) (1987). 
Mr. Morgan executed a written consent prior to undergoing 
the sinus surgery. (See, R. 97.) In that consent, Mr. Morgan 
acknowledged that he was authorizing the performance of the 
surgery and that "the nature and purpose of the operation, 
possible alternative methods of treatment and the possibility of 
complications" had been "fully explained" to him. (Id.) 
Mr. Morgan makes no claim that he lacked the capacity to consent 
to treatment or that Dr. Gibbons obtained the consent through 
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fraud or misdeed of any kind. (R. 120 - 129; Appellate Brief, 
pp. 1 - 23.) 
Mr. Morgan's written consent satisfies the Act's 
requirements even though it does not precisely parrot the 
statutory language. The Legislature determined, as a matter of 
public policy, that a written acknowledgement of an informed 
consent discussion, without a written recitation of specific 
risks, is sufficient as a matter of law to establish a patient's 
consent to health care. Because Mr. Morgan executed a written 
consent, his claim against Dr. Gibbons based on lack of informed 
consent is without basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Morgan failed 
to sustain his claim that he did not give informed consent to 
surgery. Mr. Morgan did not overcome the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act's presumption of consent because he failed to 
show by expert testimony that the surgery he underwent posed a 
"substantial and significant risk" of "serious harm." 
Dr. Gibbons' testimony cannot now carry Mr. Morgan's burden to 
establish a prima facie case because the testimony Mr. Morgan 
"intended to use" is not in the record on appeal. Furthermore, 
it is undisputed that a reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's 
position would have chosen to undergo surgery despite its risks. 
Finally, it is undisputed that Mr. Morgan executed a written 
consent after Dr. Gibbons explained the surgery to him and 
answered all of his questions. These undisputed facts 
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demonstrate that Mr. Morgan has failed as a matter of law to 
establish a legal basis for recovery against Dr. Gibbons. 
Therefore, Dr. Gibbons respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the trial court's summary judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 0$ day of October, 1993. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By: 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
ALEXNgJ. DAHL 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellee 
Gary Gibbons, M.D. 
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Appendix A 
341 JUDICIAL CODE 78-14-7.5 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — 
Proof required of patient — Defenses 
— Consent to health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered 
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that 
what the health care provider did was either ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a pa-
tient to recover damages from a health care provider 
in an action based upon the provider's failure to ob-
tain informed consent, the patient must prove the 
following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed 
between the patient and health care provider; 
and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health 
care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries aris-
ing out of the health care rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the 
patient serious harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the sub-
stantial and significant risk; and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the pa-
tient's position would not have consented to the 
health care rendered after having been fully in-
formed as to all facts relevant to the decision to 
give consent. In determining what a reasonable, 
prudent person in the patient's position would do 
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall 
use the viewpoint of the patient before health 
care was provided and before the occurrence of 
any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from 
said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of personal in-
juries suffered by the patient. 
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action 
against a health care provider based upon alleged 
failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the pa-
tient actually suffered was relatively minor; or 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from 
the health care provider was commonly known to 
the public; or ** 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the 
health care complained of, that he would accept 
the health care involved regardless of the risk; or 
that he did not want to be informed of the mat-
ters to which he would be entitled to be informed; 
or 
(d) the health care provider, after considering 
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used 
reasonable discretion as to the manner and ex-
tent to which risks were disclosed, if the health 
care provider reasonably believed that additional 
disclosures could be expected to have a substan-
tial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; 
or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a 
written consent which sets forth the nature and 
purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the patient accepts 
the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, 
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health 
care providers involved have explained his condi-
tion and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory manner and that all questions asked about 
the health care and its attendant risks have been 
answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient 
or his representative; such written consent shall 
be a defense to an action against a health care 
provider based upon failure to obtain informed 
consent unless the patient proves that the person 
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or 
shows by cleacand convincing proof that the exe-
cution of the written consent was induced by the 
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent mis-
representation or fraudulent omission to state 
material facts. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed 
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or over 
from refusing to consent to health care for his own 
person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and em-
powered to consent to any health care not prohibited 
by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, 
for his minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco pa-
rentis, whether formally serving or not, for the 
minor under his care and any guardian for his 
ward; 
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for 
his or her parent who is unable by reason of age, 
physical or mental condition, to provide such con-
sent; 
(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over; 
(0 any female regardless of age or marital sta-
tus, when given in connection with her preg-
nancy or childbirth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his 
minor brother or sister; and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandpar-
ent for his minor grandchild. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or autho-
rizes health care treatment or procedures for another 
as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liabil-
ity. 1976 
78-14-6. Writing required as bas is for liability 
for breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of r e s u l t 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care 
provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guaran-
tee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be 
obtained from any health care rendered unless the 
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set 
forth in writing and signed by the health care pro-
vider or an authorized agent of the provider. 1976 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in com-
plaint 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of 
a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a 
health care provider. The complaint shall merely 
pray for such damages as are reasonable in the prem-
ises. 1976 
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic 
damages in malpractice actions. 
In a malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic 
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconve-
nience. In no case shall the amount of damages 
awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000. 
This limitation does not affect awards of punitive 
damages. 1986 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's cont ingency 
fee in malpractice action. 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care 
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney 
